There are many people today, some of them the governor of Alaska for the next two weeks, who spit the word “Congress” out of their mouths as if it was a piece of burnt toast. They should remember that the first words of the Declaration of Independence are “In Congress, July 4, 1776.”

That’s right, a bunch of guys sitting around in a room, talking, but talking on behalf of people ranged up and down the east coast. As the document says, governments derive their just powers from consent of the governed. (And to be honest, in those days “the governed” was defined as white men who owned property.)

All this comes to mind as we see the governed around the world withholding their consent in recent days. In the Xinjiang region of China, native Uighurs are battling in the streets with Han Chinese, imported by the government as settlers from the east. Uighurs are ethnically Turkic and Muslim. The government in Beijing doesn’t trust them and so sends Han Chinese to Xinjiang, in hopes of making the region more loyal.

This is nothing like the American Revolution. This is more like the various wars Native Americans fought against European settlers for the first 400 years after the white folks arrived. To the south of Xinjiang, the Tibetan people are subjected to the same influx of Han Chinese – who in both situations, tend to be favored by the government over the natives.

Still, these are the governed, withholding their consent. On one face, it looks nothing like our revolution, but at its heart, it’s the same.

In Iran, the people gave their consent in June’s election and it was ignored, so they took to the streets. The government there is doing its best to repress the spontaneous demonstrations on behalf of liberty with violence and threats of even greater violence, but I don’t think it will work.

Just this morning I received an email about protest marches in Iranian provinces. The Iranian government wants the world to think it’s only a couple thousand people in Tehran who are dissatisfied, that the people in the provinces are quiescent and pro-Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, but that’s not true.

I’ve been reading histories of the 1979 Iranian revolution. One of the shah’s great tactical errors was letting his secret police kill protesters. (Of course, we should never forget that killing is a moral error.) If you want to stay in power in Iran, don’t kill protesters. In Islam, a deceased person is remembered on the 40th day after his or her death. In 1979, the police killed protesters. Forty days later, huge crowds turned out to remember the killings and at those events, police killed more citizens. The process repeated itself and commemorations grew exponentially, until the shah left his country behind.

The mullahs’ police and Basij militia began killing protesters on 15 June, which means we can expect a new round of protests beginning 25 July. The ayatollahs, all veterans of 1979, know this and that’s why they’re trying so hard to cram the lid on now. It won’t work.

In the summer of 1776, we the people sent those guys to sit around a room in Philadelphia and talk. They weren’t perfect, the principles they represented weren’t perfect, what they created wasn’t perfect. Two hundred and thirty-three years and five days later, it’s still not perfect. It is an improvement over what came before.

So it is in western China and Iran. The people know they are not well governed and so they withhold their consent, sometimes violently. My hope for them is the same as for us: fuller enjoyment of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.

© Mark Floegel, 2009

Most of us fall between 1) and 2). I was closer to 2) for eight years and acted accordingly. Finally, those actions – combined with actions by millions of my fellow citizens – have brought me closer to 1). Millions of others who were 1)s for eight years are now 2)s. Some of those people have guns and have turned to tragic acts of terrorism in recent weeks.

In Iran, the country has been heading one way for the last 30 years, although the momentum picked up significantly in the last four years. People finally drifted much close to 2) than 1) and acted accordingly, they came out and – apparently – voted for a change in direction. Change did not take place and the result of that failure to change is leaking out of Iran, despite the regime’s best efforts to slap a lid on communication technology.

I’ve been reading and viewing what I can and a few things are becoming clear:

1 – Politics is politics. It doesn’t matter if a political leader wears a cowboy hat or a black turban. Iran might be ultimately ruled by ayatollahs, but it calls itself the Islamic Republic of Iran and it does hold elections. Last time out, the moderates boycotted the elections, thinking their candidates could not get a fair shake. They wound up with Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, who seems to be a Persian version of George W. Bush.

No, really. By writing that, I mean no disrespect to Mr. Bush. The similarities I see are that both Mr. Bush and Mr. Ahmedinejad presented themselves to voters as regular guys, outsiders to politics as usual, not part of the ruling elite. (Mr. Ahmedinejad did not need to massage his life history as Mr. Bush did to accomplish this.) Both men in office pursued an aggressive, unilateral foreign policy, curtailed domestic civil rights and played the politics of fear and jingoism.

2 – Perception is reality. If politics is politics, then perception is reality, the same in Tehran as in Washington. The perception, both in and out of Iran, is that Mr. Ahmedinejad stole the election from Mir Hossein Mousavi. Unlike Bush-Gore 2000, this one doesn’t look like it came down to a mere 500 votes in a province inhabited by senior citizens.

More to the point, Iran is a theocracy. Ayatollahs are in charge, regardless of who is president or prime minister. Still more to the point, Iran is an Islamic theocracy and the brand of Islam practiced in Iran doesn’t allow much wiggle room on issues like lying, cheating and stealing elections.

If the general public thinks the ayatollahs are sanctioning a fraudulent election, then the regime loses ALL legitimacy. We Americans expect our politicians to lie and cheat – to a certain extent – and still trust them to act on our behalf. The ayatollahs claim to speak for God and when people like that are perceived to be lying and cheating, then even those inclined to support Mr. Ahmedinejad will begin to lose faith.

3 – The past isn’t dead. It isn’t even past. Seventy percent of the people in Iran are under 30, which means they have no personal memory of the shah. All they know about him is what they’ve been told. Whether their parents are religious or secular, chances are they have nothing good to say about the shah. One thing the parents have said about the shah is: “He was an illegitimate ruler. He fixed the elections and ignored the voice of the people.” I’m sure the people marching in the streets in Iranian cities today are starting to think, “If this government is fixing elections, then they’re no better than the shah.”

I think the ayatollahs know this. They know that if they are seen as cheats and liars, the political situation is Iran will change swiftly, and not in their favor. The soldiers and the officers of the Iranian army will see that, too. This is why the Guardian Council is recounting some ballots.

Although the success of Mr. Mousavi’s supporters depends on keeping pressure on the streets, it’s ultimately about an idea. Right now the general idea in Iran is: 2) I think my government is not acting in my best interest. People are acting accordingly.

Change may not come to Iran this week or this year, but unless the ayatollahs can get people closer to 1) than 2), then change will come to Iran and soon.

© Mark Floegel, 2009